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Abstract. After the adoption of the Corporate Governance Code (Code) in Mexico, many 
companies increased financial performance and the leveraged during the following five years; 
we investigated the effect of how those firms improved the corporate governance practices 
and how was translated into better risk return company. We analyzed how and where better 
corporate governance practices affects performance and what was the relationship with 
Transparency, New Regulation and Governance Practices. Also we explored the gaps 
between transparency and information disclosure of Mexican Firms listed in U.S stock 
exchange and non U.S listed firms our findings were related to the potential growth of the 
Mexico Financial Market, Law and Finance. 
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Resumen. Después de la adopción del Código de Gobierno Corporativo en México, algunas 
compañías incrementaron el desempeño financiero y el uso de deuda durante los siguientes 
cinco anos, nuestra investigación se enfoca en como dichas compañías mejoraron sus 
prácticas de gobierno corporativo y como estas prácticas se han traducido en un mejor 
relación de riesgo y rendimiento. En esta investigación exploramos cómo y en dónde mejores 
prácticas de gobierno corporativo afectan el desempeño y qué relación tiene con la 
Transparencia, Nuevas Regulaciones y prácticas de Gobierno Corporativo. Con lo anterior 
también identificamos aquellas compañías que cotizan fuera de México para identificar 
potenciales diferencias en dichas prácticas. 
 
1. Introduction 
In Cosmology, Dark Energy is related to the form of energy or force that 
tends to increase the universe expansion; it means Dark Energy is helping 
galaxies to separate each other, in this expansion process, even though the 
true nature of this Dark Energy process remains unknown. In Business, 
 H. García 
 
 
254 
 
Agency Theory study the conflict between management and investors, the 
conflict is translated into economic damage; several remedies to the conflict 
can be used like new regulation, economic interest or survival, event tough 
this problem is caused by the agent opportunism, agent incompetence, agent 
corruption and inadequate decision process, after decades and several 
remedies across the globe we still have the economic damage and also we 
need to explore more deeply the true nature of this conflict, see (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976) and (Denis, 2001). 
During the last two decades, many regulations changes has 
experienced toward public companies, financial institutions and lately 
government; in fact all these changes have been trigged by immense 
economic damage to the investors, taxpayers and government. However, in 
the long run, it seems that even with the regulation improvements, increments 
law enforcement and more regulated financial markets, we have not 
prevented even controlled the economic damage, the problem persists, we 
know its results and consequences but we still cannot identify and measure 
the true nature of the dark energy in business, in fact the problem has been 
studied from different perspectives and theoretical approaches, see (Strange, 
Filatotchev, Buck, & Wright, 2009).  
Corporate Governance (CG) consist in a set of practices that can be 
improved inside the organization, mainly can be directly related to the 
shareholders rights, information and transparency and the responsibility of the 
board of directors. In the long run and because its nature, CG practices 
improve every aspect of the company in order to solve the future consumer 
demand today. We can identify several actions that improves the financial 
position of the company, such actions can be CEO remuneration, relevant 
information in time and regular basis, selecting, compensating and replacing 
key executives, disclose of material risk factors or restrictions in financial 
leverage, CG practices seems to reduce the Agency Problem inside the firm 
see, (Aguilera & Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009).  
During the last decade Mexico has struggled to increase the number of 
public companies traded in to the Mexican Stock Exchange (MSE) and part of 
this effort is related to promote confidence to the investors increasing the 
financial regulation toward similar trade counterparts, USA and Canada. The 
MSE has experienced several improvements during the last decade, basically 
two major overhauls, the first one (see CNBV, 2000) was related to the 
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application of the “Code of Corporate Governance” CCG in 2001 and the 
second one (see CNBV, 2005) was a complete new law “Ley de Sociedades 
Anónimas” with the main objective to improve the level of transparency, 
information disclosure and investor protection.   
The purpose of this paper is to identify how the companies improved 
financial performance using this new regulation during the last decade. 
Specifically, how companies with better financial performance are actually 
using CCG into practice and how this new regulation has affected from a long 
time perspective. How a company with better financial performance has 
implemented the CGC? Is there is any relationship between well CG practices 
and financial performance for a MSE context?  
The CGC basically is related with five major domains, 1) corporate 
governance commitment, 2) Shareholders rights, 3) Transparency, 4) 
Management, 5)Supervisor. These practices are related in how business is 
running from inside out and also how the management can minimize moral 
hazard to the investors see (OECD, 2004). The main purpose of the CG is to 
improve business performance and at the same time minimize asymmetric 
information between Agent and the Principal, management is hired by the 
investors to run and care the short and long term business, to do so 
management is compensated and motivated to improve business conditions 
toward investors and shareholders benefits. Administrators, after 
understanding the business nature, after investing into the appropriate assets 
solves how to use and accommodate the financial capital provided by the 
investors see (Fama & Jensen, 1983). Theoretically the process seems to 
work perfect, but for the MSE sometimes the Agent and the Principal are the 
same entity or person see (Young, Peng, Ahlstrom, Bruton, & Jiang, 2008).  
We assess how new regulation in CG practices can improve financial 
performance in the long run. During the last three decades many countries 
around the world had increased controls, practices and the way the investors 
are protected from the unethical behavior and moral damage mainly derived 
from the management, we called a conflict between the agent and principal. 
The initiative means in the long run better corporate practices, transparency 
and symmetric information between the investors and the management see 
(Akerlof, 1970). Also for many countries like Mexico, means a strong and 
robust way to attract external and institutional investors into the local 
economic opportunities see (Pacheco-López, 2005).  
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Mexico MSE has trying to increase the number of new IPO’s (Initial 
Public Offers) during the last twenty years without any substantial 
improvement; also as part of the global trend has been improved dramatically 
the way the public companies disclose information to the investors. It seems 
an evident paradox, (the Dark Energy analogy) into the MSE, by one side new 
regulations and controls to the public companies should increase the number 
of participants (potential investors) and the other side the number of 
companies traded into the financial market has declined in the last two 
decades, we explored for those better financial performance companies how 
they did change the corporate governance practices. We explored the positive 
effect of the new regulation and the evident new corporate governance 
practices. We identified according with the CCG five major domains, 
corporate governance commitment, shareholders rights, transparency, 
management and supervision and auditing practices.  
 
2. Theoretical framework and previous empirical experience. 
 
Our study is based on the relationship between management practices 
and financial performance over long period of time. New management 
practices are based with the new CCG practices and mainly according with 
the OECD standards, see (OECD, 1999), (OECD, 2004) and for Mexico see 
(CCE, 1999). The new regulation requires to changes five major aspects in 
how the business is running; mainly these domains can be separated by, 
corporate governance commitment, shareholders rights, transparency, 
management and supervision and auditing practices. Figure 1 describes the 
conceptual framework between law, regulation and firm governance practices 
effect; we used those domains to link performance and governance practices 
using different firm cases for this research. 
There is strong evidence that the five major domains are positively 
correlated with financial performance. For example corporate governance 
commitment and shareholders rights, are related in how the Board of 
Directors are actually running the business, and how the management care 
about the minority shareholders interest, to do so, board of directors represent 
the shareholders interests, in this process better board structure, leadership, 
independency, responsibility and social awareness are fundamental to 
improve business performance, according with (Kappler & Love, 2005) those 
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characteristics are positively correlated with Tobin Q, ROA or Operating 
Performance. Later, in the same line, but specially to minority shareholders, 
(Chiang and Chia, 2005) found out additional board characteristics, such 
board size, ownership structure, CEO and ownership structure and 
institutional ownership are positively correlated with ROA, ROE and EPS 
financial performance.  
 
Figure 1. Theoretical Framework and previous empirical evidence 
Legal System
New Legal 
Requirements
Changes in Governance 
Practices Domains
Agency Theory
Empirical Evidence
1) Board of Directors. 
Integration, Ownership, Operation
2) Evaluation and Remuneration functions.
3) Audit and Control functions.
4) Finance and Planning
5) Disclose of Information and Transparency
Firm Performance               
Risk and Return
Ownership and Capital 
Structure
Domains references and empirical references
1) Campbell and Wasley, (1999). Agrawal, 
Charles, Knoeber.(1996) Black, Jang, Kim 
(2006) Steiner, (1972), Jensen, (1993) Yermack, 
(1996) Schellenger, Wood, and Tashakori 
(1989), Beasely(1996), Shen, Hsu and Chen 
(2006), Li, Lam, Qian and Fang (2006), Klapper 
and Love (2005) Chiang and Chia (2005), Perry 
and Shivdasani (2005).
2) Kang, Kumar and Lee (2006), Nahar (2006), 
Jiraporn, Sang Kim and Davidson III (2005), 
Epstein and Roy (2005). Jensen and Murphy 
(1990) and Bebchuk and Fried (2003)
3) Watts and Zimmerman (1978).Yeh, Lee, and 
Ko (2002), Myers and Ziegenfuss (2006), 
Holstrom and Kaplan (2003) Payne (2006), 
Petra (2006)
5) Fama, Fisher, Jensen and Roll (1969), 
Akerlof (1970), Bhattacharya (1979), Ross, 
(1978), Bushman and Smith (2003 and 2004), 
Mensah, Nguyen, Prattipati (2006) 
Mexico Case
Bhattacharya, Daouk, Jorgenson and Heinrich (2000), Gibson (2003),  
Manchuga and Teitel (2007), Chong, Guillen and Lopez de Silanes 
(2009),Garcia (2011a, 2011b)
 
 
Another domain is related in how the business is managed inside out, 
covering the most important steps in any organization, such strategic 
planning, operations, customer relations and incentives to the top 
management, in this process a strong empirical evidence can be found in 
(Jensen and Murphy, 1990) specially in the incentives part and firm value. 
Later (Epstein and Roy, 2005) found out more specific operative management 
process, such customer and strategic planning activities and how are related 
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with financial performance. The classical relationship about top management 
compensation and performance are described in several recent empirical 
studies such (Jiraporn, Kim, Davision, 2005), (Nahar, 2006), (Kang, Kumar, 
Lee, 2006). 
In our study, audit and control function are fundamental to understand the 
MSE financial resources problem, previous studies such (Machuga, S, & 
Teitel, K. 2007) and (Chong, Guillen & Lopez de Silanes, 2009) indicated a 
MSE systemic problematic situation to access new economic resources, part 
of the problem is related to the number of public companies traded into the 
MSE, which have been reduced in the last decade, either using stock or bond 
instruments. Also (Garcia, 2011a, 2011b) found out the increasing use of debt 
in the last decade and the decreasing average return for the shareholders, 
both concepts convergence with the level of debt and return with companies 
with the free trade counterparts countries, United States and Canada.  
The audit and control function is important to assure better use of 
resources to the investors, the function specifically is related to oversee the 
operative performance and the operative objectives of the company as well 
the practices and actions that have to be done to assure better risk and return 
to the investors, this function also oversees the use of debt, investments and 
correct use of the resources. Previous empirical research can support this 
line, for example (Myers and Ziegenfuss, 2006) asses the audit process and 
the internal control mechanism to find out if the company can achieve better 
responsibility and effectiveness. Also, but using different approach (Petra, 
2006) research the rationale behind the corporate governance reforms and 
the importance to corporate collapses, an expost and exante research.  
The last domain is transparency, several researches have indicated the 
benefits to disclose information on time and adequately, for example 
(Bushman and Smith, 2003 and 2004) study how the transparency change 
across different countries and also across different legal systems, Mexico 
case is not the exception, several changes in terms of transparency has 
improved to be according with the OECD standards and also with the 
commercial partners, USA and Canada, the CCG incorporates those 
improvements. The benefits can be measured as additional productivity and 
additional tangible economic firm value, as is described in (Bushman and 
Smith, 2003) at the end, the effect seems to reduce information asymmetries.  
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According with the theoretical framework based on Figure1 there is 
positive effect using governance practices and financial performance, 
according (Machuga, et al., 2007) found out positive quality earnings resulting 
from new corporate governance practices, they assess the effect of the 
implementation of the CCG and the financial result using different variables 
and different financial perspective either operative or assets productivity, the 
study covered two year timeline. Also another similar study to Mexico is 
(Chong, et al, 2009) found out positive relationship between firm value and 
other financial performance variables and corporate governance practices, 
also using one year short term assess. Both studies concluded positive 
financial performance in short time range and governance practices, but also 
they found out one of the major problems into the MSE, is the access to new 
capital.  
Nevertheless, previous study (Garcia, et al 2011) indicate in the long term 
analysis there is a misconnection between governance practices and financial 
performance, using ROA, ROE or Capital Structure analysis in a 10 years 
window period, the results indicated the average performance of the public 
companies traded into the MSE has steadily declined and using more debt, 
but also the number of public companies traded into the financial market 
declined, due to new transparency and regulation, the agency cost for a 
typical public company raised and finally there is a clear disconnection 
between regulation, CG practices and how the individual firms are managed.  
There are several explanations to the disconnection between regulation, 
CG practices and how the individual firms are managed, especially in 
emerging markets, (La Porta. Lopez de Silanes and Shleifer, 1998) found out 
there is a correlation between the ownership structure and CG practices. 
Later, (Gibson, 2003) found out a positive relationship between local and 
limited ownership structure, firm performance and CG practices. Also different 
explanation previously founded is the potential insider information into the 
MSE according with (Bhattacharya, Daouk, Jorgenson, Heinrich, 2000). 
 
3. Methodology, financial and qualitative data. 
 
The purpose of this research is to answer how a company with better 
financial performance uses or adopt new corporate governance practices? 
We wanted to explore and identify those companies with better financial 
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performance and finally how kind of actions, strategies or governance 
practices were implemented inside the company. In other words, we wanted 
to identify the connection between new regulation (CCG) and new 
management practices were actually the explanations or cause and effect 
with better financial performance. 
This research is divided in three steps, first the discrimination process, 
eliminating those companies with poor and lower financial performance out of 
the study, then having companies with outstanding financial performance we 
explored the annuals reports to identify those practices or actions related with 
the CCG, we wanted to link financial performance facts and actions or events 
in how companies were applied corporate governance practices. Finally, we 
compared and matched the actual events, actions and governance practices 
with the five most important domains extracted from the CCG. We started our 
data analysis with 55 companies and 44 financial quarters resulting in 2624 
observations, all financial data was calculated without inflation effect, we used 
real numbers. Data covered from 1995 to 2005, quarterly data and firm 
annual reports; our data was extracted from Economatica, Bloomberg, official 
site MSE, “Infosel Financiero” and “El Financiero” which were the major 
financial sources of data in Mexico, the universe of companies holds up to the 
75% of the MSE in terms of capitalization. 
The discrimination process was basically to construct a second universe 
of companies with outstanding and excellent financial performance record 
over the period of analysis. This first step by itself involved those companies 
with better financial performance before and after the implementation of the 
CCG; we used the following formulas in order to define for our research better 
financial performance: 
 
Return on Equity (ROE) = return on equity.  
Return on Assets (ROA) = return on assets. 
Increase in Revenues (IS) = %Change in revenues. 
Increase in Operative Income (MGN) = % Change in Operative income.  
Net Income (NI) = % Change in Net Income before extraordinary items.  
Income to Sales (NI / S) = ratio in % between net income and net sales.  
Debt to Assets (DR) = ratio between total debt and total assets. 
Debt to Equity (DER): ratio % total assets and book value of equity. 
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For each performance variable and company we used one Hypothesis 
and compared the previous financial performance results prior to the new 
regulation with post regulation results, the statistical tool that we used at this 
point was the T Test mean and variance sample comparison, we tested 440 
null hypothesis. Previous researches used similar formulas usually in a short 
term period analysis; we opted to use these same variables in two period 
windows, the pre code CCG or exante period and the post code.  
The pre code CCG included quarterly and annual financial data from 
1995 to 2000. The implementation of the CCG was in 2000, we opted to use 
long term perspective analysis, the post code CCG range was from 2001 to 
2005. During this step we separated the local companies from the non local 
companies, we defined the non local companies to those companies which 
regulation, CG practices and stocks were not only traded in the MSE. Table 1 
describes the universe of companies we started our research.  
 
Table 1. Universe of companies, sectors, local and foreign companies 
Sector/Company LC*/ FSC**  Sector/Company LC*/ FSC**  Sector/Company LC*/ FSC** 
Commercial   Building   Manufacture  
Alsea LC  Ara LC  Bachoco LC / FSC 
Benavides LC  Cemex LC / FSC  Bafar LC 
Collado LC  Ceramic LC / FSC  Bimbo LC 
Comerci LC  Cmoctez LC  Femsa LC / FSC 
Coppel LC  GCC LC  GCorvi LC 
Elektra LC  GEO LC  Geupec LC 
Fragua LC  GMD LC / FSC  Gmodelo LC 
Gigante LC  Hogar LC  Gmodern LC 
Liverpool LC  Lamosa LC  Gruma LC 
Marti LC  Mining   Herdez LC 
GPH LC  Autlan LC  Hilasal LC 
Saba LC  GMexico LC  Kimberly LC 
Soriana LC  Peñoles LC  KOF LC / FSC 
Walmart LC  Others   Maseca LC 
Communications   Alfa LC / FSC  Vitro LC / FSC 
Cintra LC  CIE LC  Services  
Telmex LC / FSC  Desc LC / FSC  CMR LC 
Televisa LC / FSC  Gcarso LC  Posadas LC 
TV Azteca LC / FSC  Gissa LC  Realtur LC 
   Gsanborn LC    
   Imsa LC / FSC    
Sectory/Industry  Companies   LC* FCS* 
Retail  14   14  
Communications  4     1 3 
Building and Construction  9     6 3 
Manufacture  15   11 4 
Others  7     4 3 
Mining  3     3  
Services  3     3  
Total Companies  55   42 13 
* Local Company ** Foreign Stock Company 
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The null hypotheses are described below; we assess the hypotheses at 
two levels, the overall level which includes the 55 companies or MSE system 
perspective and firm level, which assess the individual performance for each 
company using a set of eight financial ratios. The null hypothesis states in 
other words there is the same financial performance from 1995 to 2005, it 
means that there was no effect, nor change or either different financial 
performance before and after the 2000, testing the MSE as whole or using 
individual firms.  
 
The Null Hypothesis for the 55 companies:  
There is no difference between exante Mean and variance for H1 (ROE), H2 
(ROA), H3 (% Sales), H4 (MGN), H5 (NI), H6, (NI / S) H7 (DR), H8 (DER) and 
expost Mean and variance for H1 (ROE), H2 (ROA), H3 (% Sales), H4 
(MGN), H5 (NI), H6, (NI / S) H7 (DR), H8 (DER). 
 
Using the eight performance variables from the first step we compared 
both periods the pre and post code CCG using T Test method comparing 
means and variances and identify if they were significantly different, during 
1995 there was a economic recession in Mexico that last almost 4 quarters, 
the negative effect was for the entire population, the rest of time period 
analysis remains without significant economic changes. Because the data 
was affected homogenously to the entire population and also the time frame 
study includes almost 44 quarters we opted not Winsorize the data. The 
overall performance variables descriptive statistical data are in Table 2. 
Initially we started the study with 55 companies, then after the statistical 
T Test we had the following results for each variable tested. The null 
hypothesis for each variable was there is no difference between means and 
variances, comparing pre code and postcode results; we used Alfa 5%. The T 
Test help us to identify if there was a significant change performance before 
and after the regulation, but the test didn’t asses the direction of the data 
positive or negative effect, only the difference, for example it means if a 
company performs pre code ROA mean 10% and post code 5%, there is a 
difference between pre and post code, but not better performance.  
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Table 2. Performance variables descriptive statistics 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Exante Mean (Precode) 11.1% 4.6% 12.2% 14.3% 75.2% 10.1% 43.2% 87.8% 
Expost Mean (Postcode) 7.2% 3.2% 6.7% 11.9% 60.9% 13.4% 50.5% 125.4% 
Variance  EXANTE 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 1.64 0.01 0.00 0.05 
Variance  EXPOST 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.39 0.07 0.00 0.01 
N Exante 1384 1384 1335 1384 1335 1376 1384 1384 
N Expost 1240 1240 1240 1240 1240 1240 1240 1240 
T Test Critical Value 2.02 2.02 2.02 2.02 2.02 2.02 2.02 2.02 
T Test Stat (Paired Sample)  1.50 1.76 2.02 4.71 0.39 0.53 8.69 8.00 
P Value 0.14 0.09 0.05 0.00 0.70 0.60 0.00 0.00 
Standard Error 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.01 
         
Observations 2624 2624 2575 2624 2575 2616 2624 2624 
Mean 10% 4% 10% 13% 68% 12% 47% 106% 
Median 9% 4% 5% 13% 5% 10% 47% 103% 
Std Dev 19% 6% 26% 6% 480% 31% 10% 53% 
Min -117% -36% -37% -6% -1594% -138% 18% -295% 
Max 142% 29% 142% 37% 4072% 812% 73% 391% 
1- H1 Return on Equity,  
2- H2 Return on Assets,  
3- H3 % Increase Sales,  
4- H4 Gross Marging.  
5- H5 Net Income Margin.                          
6- H6 % Increase Net Income,  
7- H7 Debt/Assets  Ratio,  
8- H8 Debt/Equity Ratio 
 
We excluded in our research the entire financial and banking sector 
due to major overhaul during the same pre code period and also major 
regulations changes. All the data was compiled from 1995 to 2005. We select 
only those companies with financial information available for the period of 
analysis; finally we started the first step with only 55 public companies, we 
identify the universe in 6 major economic sectors, retail 14, communications 
4, construction 9, manufacture 15, others 7, mining 3 and services 3, our 
global Hypothesis by variable results are below.  
At the firm level we calculated same performance variables and we 
used the same statistical test to compare the performance before and after 
the CCG, we consolidated the information by industry, local and foreign, and 
firm level in Table 3.  
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Table 3. Firm level statistical test  p-values mean paired samples  (Alfa 5%*) 
Sector/Industry LC / FSC** ROE ROA % Sales MGN NI (NI / S) DR DER 
Commercial          
Alsea LC 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.46 0.09 0.07 0.09 
Benavides LC 0.01 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.56 0.00 0.00 0.01 
Collado LC 0.89 0.36 0.10 0.42 0.57 0.54 0.00 0.00 
Comerci LC 0.25 0.77 0.30 0.10 0.58 0.74 0.00 0.00 
Coppel LC 0.25 0.77 0.30 0.10 0.58 0.74 0.00 0.00 
Elektra LC 0.27 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.25 0.00 0.01 0.10 
Fragua LC 0.00 0.00 0.85 0.00 0.16 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Gigante LC 0.00 0.00 0.99 0.67 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Liverpool LC 0.02 0.27 0.24 0.00 0.43 0.42 0.00 0.00 
Marti LC 0.56 0.06 0.92 0.00 0.05 0.47 0.00 0.00 
GPH LC 0.00 0.00 0.13 0.00 0.14 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Saba LC 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.21 0.28 0.00 0.87 0.73 
Soriana LC 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Walmart LC 0.13 0.65 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
          
Communications                  
Cintra LC 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Telmex LC / FSC 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.05 0.33 0.00 0.00 
Televisa LC / FSC 0.00 0.17 0.11 0.00 0.26 0.01 0.00 0.00 
TV Azteca LC / FSC 0.36 0.67 0.06 0.00 0.87 0.90 0.03 0.08 
Services LC / FSC                 
CMR LC 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.63 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Posadas LC 0.64 0.27 0.00 0.00 0.98 0.14 0.00 0.00 
Realtur LC 0.47 0.50 0.59 0.64 0.14 0.44 0.40 0.01 
          
Construction                  
Ara LC 0.15 0.70 0.00 0.00 0.78 0.46 0.00 0.01 
Cemex LC / FSC 0.01 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.65 0.00 0.01 0.01 
Ceramic LC / FSC 0.51 0.34 0.18 0.23 0.15 0.36 0.00 0.00 
Cmoctez LC 0.11 0.17 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.61 0.00 0.01 
GCC LC 0.00 0.39 0.00 0.43 0.35 0.16 0.00 0.00 
GEO LC 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.96 0.35 0.01 0.00 0.00 
GMD LC / FSC 0.11 0.21 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.25 0.00 0.01 
Hogar LC 0.10 0.06 0.26 0.12 0.17 0.17 0.00 0.00 
Lamosa LC 0.89 0.39 0.72 0.88 0.08 0.33 0.00 0.00 
          
Mining          
Autlan LC 0.10 0.45 0.55 0.03 0.89 0.01 0.00 0.00 
GMexico LC 0.44 0.14 0.10 0.16 0.71 0.01 0.00 0.00 
Peñoles LC 0.03 0.02 0.40 0.00 0.94 0.00 0.00 0.00 
          
Manufacture LC / FSC          
Bachoco LC / FSC 0.06 0.05 0.03 0.06 0.53 0.04 0.69 0.93 
Bafar LC 0.04 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.59 0.01 0.25 
Bimbo LC 0.06 0.56 0.50 0.06 0.71 0.99 0.00 0.00 
Femsa LC / FSC 0.99 0.60 0.09 0.00 0.72 0.22 0.05 0.03 
GCorvi LC 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.26 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Geupec LC 0.10 0.62 0.00 0.02 0.26 0.17 0.00 0.00 
Gmodelo LC 0.00 0.70 0.94 0.00 0.82 0.01 0.00 0.00 
Gmodern LC 0.12 0.54 0.68 0.00 0.80 0.08 0.30 0.37 
Gruma LC 0.02 0.14 0.33 0.47 0.49 0.01 0.81 0.66 
Herdez LC 0.27 0.35 0.62 0.62 0.89 0.16 0.00 0.00 
Hilasal LC 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.46 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Kimberly LC 0.16 0.02 0.27 0.01 0.31 0.00 0.00 0.00 
KOF LC / FSC 0.01 0.02 0.34 0.00 0.34 0.00 0.59 0.31 
Maseca LC 0.00 0.03 0.53 0.00 0.21 0.00 0.06 0.05 
Vitro LC / FSC 0.26 0.69 0.67 0.00 0.29 0.25 0.00 0.00 
          
Others LC / FCS          
Alfa LC / FSC 0.15 0.13 0.36 0.00 0.43 0.03 0.00 0.00 
CIE LC 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.08 0.09 
Desc LC / FSC 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.21 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Gcarso LC 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.35 0.00 0.06 0.09 
Gissa LC 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Gsanborn LC 0.02 0.10 0.01 0.04 0.42 0.95 0.20 0.20 
* Values are statistical significant at < .05    
** LC Local Companies, FSC Foreign Stock Companies   
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Table 3. cont. 
 Statistical Significance H0 Rejected 
 ROE ROA % Sales MGN NI (NI / S) DR DER 
Rejected H0 29 25 22 38 7 30 43 42 
Not Rejected H0 26 30 33 17 48 25 12 13 
Total 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 
 
The second step required several assumptions to identify those 
companies with outstanding performance, the companies must had the 
following requisites, positive performance compared pre and post code, 
exante and expost comparison, also we selected those companies where 5 
variables out of 8 improve (minimum 5 rejected null hypothesis discrimination 
step one) during the pre and post period of study, and also we included those 
companies with the best performance inside the industry for the entire period 
of study, to do this last requirement we took the 10 years average industry 
ratio (variables by industry) and then selected the company with the best 
performance during the period of analysis, see Table 4.  
 
Table 4. Companies mean performance variables 
Company ROE ROA % Sales MGN NI (NI / S) DR DER 
ALSEA 14% 9% 22% 11% 33% 10% 33% 51% 
TELMEX* 24% 12% 4% 35% 19% 21% 45% 103% 
POSADAS 7% 4% 7% 21% 29% 12% 56% 129% 
CMOCTEZ 18% 15% 23% 43% 34% 31% 14% 17% 
GMEXICO 12% 3% 25% 25% 338% 16% 46% 101% 
GSANBORNS 14% 6% 30% 14% 586% 8% 58% 144% 
BACHOCO* 14% 11% 10% 12% 55% 12% 21% 27% 
KOF* 17% 8% 19% 15% 28% 8% 52% 113% 
Means including Pre and Post period * FSC Foreign Stock Company 
 
After we identified those companies with better financial performance 
then the third step involved identify the five major CCG domains into the real 
world implementation, we used annuals reports from the public companies 
from 2001 to 2005 and track down every domain during five year window. The 
CCG most important domains were 1) corporate governance commitment, 2) 
shareholders rights, 3) transparency, 4) management and 5) supervisory 
board matters and auditing, all domains were based on the Figure 1 the 
theoretical and previous research.  
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New regulation related to the adoption and practice of the CCG 
required to answer a questionnaire where it is included also the five major 
domains previously discussed, we reviewed also the questions and the 
answers, but we identified deficiencies such, closed answers like yes or not, 
limited open wide explanations, very limited information about how really the 
company addressed the governance inside the firm, we opted to not include 
this questionnaire in our research. We reviewed the annual reports and 
updated news related with each case; also we included the additional 
information disclosed by the firm related to activities and board decisions in a 
traditional form. We found out a wide open and un-systemic ways to disclosed 
qualitative information related to the governance practices inside the firm.  
For example one company can disclosed a detailed information about the 
corporate practices and internal controls, such strategic planning activities, 
capital structure policies, compensation and internal controls after the CGC 
regulations, but in the opposite direction we also found out companies with 
weak and very vague information about specific actions, objectives and 
activities devoted to improve governance practices inside the firm. We 
analyzed the information available to the investors, regarding governance 
practices and all relevant information that can really translate into better 
corporate governance practices, we graded the companies in three levels, 
company with grade A did inform a complete disclosed information from the 
board members with specific details related to the five major domains and 
complete transparency, also we track down all annual reports and the 
consistency of the governance practices year to year. Firms graded with the 
Level B informed about the activities in general forms and the improvements 
from previous annual reports. Companies graded with Level C informed about 
the compromise of the company to respect the new regulation and 
transparency issues, but not additional information, just one or two vague 
paragraphs from the annual report. Previous studies related with corporate 
governance compliance are related with same similar questionnaires, direct 
questions or direct interviews. Every firm we have reviewed informed about 
the compromise of the company to be in Law and according with the new 
regulation, all answered the questionnaire required by Law, but that doesn’t 
mean they were actually informed to the investors into the clear and 
transparent way about corporate governance practices inside the firm. 
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4. Results and discussions.  
 
Basically, the MSE as a system, we can concluded the capital structure 
for the public companies traded into the MSE has been change during the pre 
code and post code regulation process, this means 43 out of 55 companies 
are using more debt. Also in the performance aspect, the returns as a 
business or shareholder (ROA or ROE) 25 and 29 respectively out of 55 were 
deteriorated during the time period of analysis. Moreover, the operative 
margin (MGN) 38 out of 55 companies declined for the same period. The 
MSE as whole has been reducing the profitability and increasing financial risk, 
this was not the expected results from improvements in corporate governance 
practices.  
According with the results, all variables deteriorated after the 2001 new 
CCG adoption; we divided performance into two major components, the 
profitability and the capital structure, the profitability part showed lower returns 
in terms of assets and shareholders also in terms of change % in sales and 
net income, but also in terms of use more debt and less equity, the capital 
structure part. Table 6 describe same data by sector, we included the GDP for 
the same period in order to understand the overall context, in this case the 
previous pre code GDP was 3.5% compared with the 1.9% for the post code 
performance, statistically there was no significant difference between both 
periods, the P-value was .1826. In the overall results we concluded the public 
companies in Mexico were using substantially more debt and decreased in 
performance related to assets or equity. For the CCG domains 1, 3, 4 and 5 
were not according with the economic results, we expected more 
transparency, detailed governance commitment, better management 
practices and major overall supervision, none of these domains as a system 
improved.  
After the performance filter, we selected from 55 companies only 8 
companies and three of them were traded outside the MSE, specifically in the 
US stock market. Table 7 represent the statistical data for each company and 
the results pre and post regulation, in the overall 2 out 8 were from the 
manufacture, one for retail, communications, services, construction, mining 
and others. In general terms for the entire period, ROA and ROE for all the 
companies selected were double digits except for only one, also for the entire 
period all companies perform net margin, (net profits / revenues) above 8%. 
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We assessed the best financial performers from the MSE and we expected 
the best CGC practices.  
We analyzed the annual reports, board reports, news, most important 
events and available investor information for the eight selected companies, 
during post code period, we discovered several gaps that are not included in 
the regulation framework and CCG practices. First, although there is a written 
report with questions covered the five domains, the answers are closed or 
limited answers like yes or no and very limited information explained for the 
discrepancies with the governance practices, the main issue was there is not 
specific format or report to inform about the specific discrepancies. Moreover, 
there was no way to track down any specific activity in the past, related to 
improve corporate governance practices, for example the Audit 
Compensation Committee, disclosed actions and plans to improve some 
specific problems inside the firm into the near future, then one year or years 
later we never heard again about the implementation and improvements 
made in the past. There was no way to identify the historic improvements 
made by corporate governance practices implemented.  
We also found companies with full disclosure information about 
governance practices, for example in very descriptive form; we discovered 
how the board was structured, how was operated and the responsibilities in 
detail. Although those concepts are included in corporate governance 
questionnaire we discovered documents with a full in detail information about 
corporate governance practices, actions and specific improvements. Also in 
the same line we found out, for example the company debt policy and capital 
structure, compensation policies and strategic planning actions to be 
implemented inside the firm, But even with the entire full disclosure there was 
not specific format, structure or specific way to inform the details about the 
actions and governance practices improvements in the past and the impact 
for the future, the gap in all these examples were a wide open diversity to 
inform and disclose information and how governance practices were 
performed inside the firm. This problem seems to be very common in all 
around the world in different corporate governance regulation and law 
changes.  
Our research based on the eight most profitable companies and all 
qualitative information related to governance practices, we discovered with 
grade A just two companies out of eight had a complete and full disclosure of 
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the activities, objectives, planning and reports related to governance 
practices. We found out several important conditions in all the reports 
disclosed to the investors, first they disclosed the activities, planning and 
compromises resulted from previous specific board committees and also the 
potential solutions in several important business areas, such compensation, 
planning, financial and budget control and capital structure. They disclosed 
information with specific activities by area and executives in charge.  
By definition all the companies must complained with the law, including 
CGC code, regulation, transparency and information disclosure, but not all 
companies really disclosed how to protect the investors and governance 
practices, in full detail, two out eight disclosed in a semi complete way, with 
the grade B, and finally four out eight disclosed in a very limited way or not 
disclosed information. The way was simple, the questionnaire (as part of the 
change regulation) able the public companies to fulfill that gap. See Table 5. 
It’s describes the event or the action implemented inside the firm that was 
available to the investors as a part of the transparency process, the numbers 
represent the number of events, news and activities during the post code 
period and classified by domain, from 2001 to 2005, as you can analyze the 
information available to the investor in the overall perspective was very 
limited.  
 
Table 5. Corporate governance domains 
Company / Domains 
Corporate governance domains 
Grade 
1 2 3 4 5 
ALSEA 1 1 5 1 1 A 
TELMEX 9 1 0 9 7 A 
POSADAS 3 0 0 4 3 C 
CMOCTEZ 0 0 1 0 0 C 
GMEXICO 1 0 0 2 0 C 
GSANBORNS 0 0 1 0 0 C 
BACHOCO 1 0 1 0 0 B 
KOF 0 2 4 0 1 B 
1) Corporate Governance Commitment,  
2) Shareholders Rights,  
3) Transparency,  
4) Management,  
5) Supervisor 
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This pattern is not related to specific industry, neither the company 
experience to inform to the investors, particular sector or specific economic 
condition the pattern seems to have relationship with the financial culture and 
ownership structure of the entire MSE. In other words, there was a clear new 
regulation with specific changes in how to improve corporate governance all 
around the five domains described and supported theoretically, but in order to 
facilitate the implementation and operate this new regulation to the public 
companies the new regulation was to fulfill a questionnaire where 95% of the 
answers were yes or no. Law changes seems to be according with the OECD 
standards, but the implementation process able to public companies to really 
being transparent and inform properly to the investors.  
 
5. Future agenda and final conclusions.  
 
The purpose of this research was to understand more the relationship 
between financial performance, new regulation and governance practices. We 
wanted to explore how companies with outstanding financial performance 
actually applies good corporate governance practices Table 4 and Table 5, 
how the MSE as whole has benefited from this new regulations trend around 
the globe Table 3, and finally understand how CG as part of new regulation 
was adopted by the best financially companies from the MSE Table 5.  
Specifically, we wanted to know how firms with outstanding financial 
performance apply day by day governance practices. How these companies 
disclosed information regarding the new CGC regulation, also explored if 
there was any relationship between the best financial performers from the 
MSE and the best governance practices implemented in the real world.  
We can concluded that Mexico authorities has implemented in Law the 
best governance practices around the OECD members, also we promoted 
that the only way to improve economic growth is to regulated how MSE 
operate and promote investment. We believed that all new regulation and 
economic liberalization experienced in Mexico are part of the globalization 
process, after this research, we suggest that all the changes in law were 
correct and good for the country, but we certainly promote more control on the 
implementation of law, more standardize form to disclose information and 
transparency. The law is correct, the problem is the implementation.  
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Several facts we have to mention before we opt to describe our future 
agenda, first it seems that opportunistic behavior from management, agent 
principal relationship conflict, moral damage and all directly or lateral 
problems has not been controlled during the last two decades, even with all 
new wave of regulations, law changes and financial controls. More over it 
seems that the problem was moved from public companies to financial 
institutions or sector and in some parts of the world even government 
agencies. 
We discovered a paradox during our research; new corporate 
governance practices should improve performance in the long run, for any 
company, period. With this in mind, we also discovered how the MSE has 
been struggle to improve the number of public companies into the system 
improving regulation and facilitate law and normative to the investors in order 
to create a more friendly legal environment and more clear and transparent 
information, the main purpose is to minimize the effect described in the 
previous paragraph. This trend is not only for Mexico, this trend is part of the 
globalization process that the financial system as a whole has been change 
and evolved in the last twenty years. The problems and all potential solutions 
are far away to be solved; more over the problems are now more complicated 
and more virulent (government level) than never before. 
We believed that part of the solution is related between the regulation 
and law changes and how the information is disclosed. Our research let us to 
pinpoint how a abnormal good performance company can be either, with 
outstanding governance practices with a full descriptions of activities and at 
the same time a outstanding performance company with poor and limited 
information in how they manage and control the resources of the investors. 
Law enforcement, financial cultural level and ownership structure are part of 
the solution.  
We also pinpoint at this level, the MSE as a whole and with the 
available information, we cannot conclude if there was a relationship between 
corporate governance practices and performance, we can conclude there was 
a new regulation, with all the intentions to improve the investor position and 
with the purpose to minimize the opportunistic behavior of the management, 
as we found out in others countries. But at the same time, we were able to 
describe a series of discrepancies in how the information was disclosed to the 
investors. 
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We promote several changes not the law, but to the way the 
information was disclosed, for example, we can opt to standardize all the 
information in terms of governance practices and how is disclosed to the 
investors, this apply to all five domains of corporate governance practices 
described in this research. Second, we can also promote the governance 
index for all the companies traded in the MSE as a part of information 
disclosure. Third, is important to control the level of debt and the performance 
of the firm with specific measures and standards, that allows the managers 
and investors to understand the consequences if are not controlled, also a 
specific way to measure (financial ratios in a systematic way) and how are 
disclosed is very important. Our last comment is related to the questionnaire, 
we believed that can be improve in how the answers are addressed and also 
how the information must be disclose.   
 
Table 6. Descriptive statistics by industry 
Variables * 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
 Commercial  Communications 
Exante Mean 18% 6% 21% 5% 106% 4% 42% 51%  9% 4% 4% 19% 71% 29% 50% 147% 
Expost Mean 11% 6% 10% 7% 36% 5% 48% 109%  12% 4% 5% 17% 74% 64% 63% 222% 
Variance Exante 0.06 0.00 0.13 0.00 4.03 0.00 0.00 0.74  0.01 0.00 0.03 0.00 6.54 0.14 0.00 0.12 
Variance Expost 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.22 0.00 0.00 0.01  0.07 0.00 0.02 0.00 4.86 2.92 0.00 0.17 
N Exante 306 306 306 306 306 306 306 306  130 130 118 130 118 126 130 130 
N Expost 280 280 280 280 280 280 280 280  120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 
All Observations 586 586 586 586 586 586 586 586  250 250 238 250 238 246 250 250 
Mean 16% 0.06 18% 6% 70% 4% 45% 78%  10% 0.04 4% 18% 62% 43% 57% 192% 
Median 12% 0.07 11% 7% 14% 5% 47% 93%  9% 0.04 1% 19% -4% 26% 58% 171% 
Std Dev 26% 0.04 38% 4% 351% 5% 10% 92%  33% 0.07 28% 8% 439% 126% 9% 80% 
Min -23% -0.1 -19% -2% -609% -10% 29% -295%  -51% -0.1 -37% -1% -1091% -46% 43% 104% 
Max 142% 0.1 142% 11% 1524% 13% 64% 272%  125% 0.3 84% 33% 1793% 812% 72% 391% 
 Mining  Manufacture 
Exante Mean 10% 3% 18% 18% 174% 15% 34% 56%  13% 6% 7% 13% 57% 9% 37% 71% 
Expost Mean 5% 1% 14% 10% 138% 2% 53% 120%  8% 4% 5% 11% 47% 6% 45% 102% 
Variance Exante 0.00 0.00 0.13 0.01 27.12 0.01 0.01 0.08  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.40 0.00 0.00 0.01 
Variance Expost 0.02 0.00 0.08 0.01 16.50 0.02 0.00 0.09  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.25 0.00 0.00 0.01 
N Exante 72 72 72 72 72 72 72 72  394 394 380 394 380 390 394 394 
N Expost 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60  340 340 340 340 340 340 340 340 
All Observations 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132  734 734 720 734 720 730 734 734 
Mean 8% 0.02 16% 15% 158% 9% 42% 85%  11% 0.05 6% 12% 50% 7% 41% 86% 
Median 8% 0.01 3% 13% 11% 11% 44% 81%  10% 0.05 5% 12% 11% 7% 42% 84% 
Std Dev 12% 0.04 39% 12% 694% 14% 13% 46%  9% 0.04 13% 3% 227% 5% 8% 31% 
Min -26% -0.1 -30% -6% -661% -29% 23% 30%  -16% 0.0 -17% 5% -368% -6% 26% 41% 
Max 30% 0.2 134% 37% 3876% 33% 62% 172%  35% 0.2 43% 18% 1041% 22% 55% 155% 
* 1- H1 Return on Equity, 2- H2 Return on Assets, 3- H3 % Increase Sales, 4- H4 Gross Marging. 5- H5 Net Income Margin,                 
6-  H6 % Increase Net Income, 7- H7- Debt/Assets Ratio, 8- H8 Debt/Equity Ratio. 
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Table 6. cont. 
Variables * 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8      1        2   3   4   5   6   7    8  
 Services  Construction  
Exante Mean 0% 2% 7% 17% -17% 1% 39% 94%  13% 3% 10% 14% 10% 3% 52% 90%  
Expost Mean 3% 1% 2% 12% 2% 5% 40% 77%  8% 5% 10% 17% 68% 10% 52% 126%  
Variance Exante 0.15 0.01 0.00 0.00 10.27 0.27 0.02 0.34  0.04 0.00 0.02 0.00 7.13 0.10 0.00 0.12  
Variance Expost 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 7.36 0.01 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 8.60 0.00 0.00 0.01  
N Exante 67 67 63 67 63 67 67 67  215 215 207 215 207 215 215 215  
N Expost 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60  200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200  
All Observations 127 127 123 127 123 127 127 127  415 415 407 415 407 415 415 415  
Mean 3% 0.02 5% 14% -8% 5% 38% 81%  11% 0.04 11% 16% 33% 6% 51% 104%  
Median 5% 0.03 3% 14% -9% 7% 39% 73%  10% 0.05 7% 18% 7% 11% 50% 109%  
Std Dev 22% 0.08 10% 6% 353% 31% 12% 40%  21% 0.08 26% 7% 467% 31% 12% 50%  
Min -117% -0.4 -9% 2% -1572% -138% 18% 30%  -33% -0.3 -28% -6% -1290% -96% 32% 3%  
Max 35% 0.2 28% 26% 792% 50% 58% 178%  72% 0.3 107% 24% 2262% 125% 73% 188%  
 Others  All Sectors **GDP 
Exante Mean 15% 8% 17% 14% 126% 10% 49% 105%  11% 5% 12% 14% 75% 10% 43% 88% 3.5% 
Expost Mean 3% 2% 1% 8% 59% 2% 53% 122%  7% 3% 7% 12% 61% 13% 50% 125% 1.9% 
Variance Exante 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.00 24.72 0.00 0.00 0.03  0.04 0.00 0.05 0.00 11.60 0.07 0.01 0.20 0.05 
Variance Expost 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 3.81 0.00 0.00 0.03  0.01 0.00 0.02 0.00 6.08 0.42 0.00 0.05 0.02 
N Exante 200 200 189 200 189 200 200 200  1384 1384 1335 1384 1335 1376 1384 1384 23 
N Expost 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180  1240 1240 1240 1240 1240 1240 1240 1240 20 
All Observations 380 380 369 380 369 380 380 380  2624 2624 2575 2624 2575 2616 2624 2624 43 
Mean 9% 0.05 10% 12% 112% 6% 51% 113%  10% 0.04 10% 13% 68% 12% 47% 106% 2.8% 
Median 10% 0.05 6% 12% 8% 6% 51% 109%  9% 0.04 5% 13% 5% 10% 47% 103% 3.2% 
Std Dev 12% 0.06 25% 4% 829% 8% 7% 31%  19% 0.06 26% 6% 480% 31% 10% 53% 4.1% 
Min -23% -0.1 -27% 2% -1594% -13% 37% 61% -117% -0.4 -37% -6% -1594% -138% 18% -295% -9.2% 
Max 0.346 0.175 0.88 0.18 40.72 0.227 0.643 1.88  1.42 0.287 1.422 0.37 40.72 8.12 0.73 3.91 8.4% 
*   1- H1 Return on Equity, 2- H2 Return on Assets, 3- H3 % Increase Sales, 4- H4 Gross Marging. 5- H5 Net Income Margin,                 
6-  H6 % Increase Net Income, 7- H7- Debt/Assets Ratio, 8- H8 Debt/Equity Ratio. 
** Gross Domestic Product 
 
 
Table 7. Selected companies statistical results 
 ROE ROA %Sales MGM NI NI/S DR DER  ROE ROA %Sales MGM NI NI/S DR DER 
 ALSEA  POSADAS 
Exante Mean 18% 11% 51% 14% 20% 15% 36% 58%  9% 5% 10% 24% 31% 16% 53% 118% 
Expost Mean 12% 8% 11% 10% 38% 8% 32% 48%  6% 3% 3% 17% 27% 7% 59% 142% 
Variance  EXANTE 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.07 0.01 0.00 0.02  0.07 0.01 0.01 0.00 24.08 0.09 0.00 0.10 
Variance  EXPOST 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.98 0.00 0.00 0.01  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.82 0.00 0.00 0.01 
N Exante 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8  24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 
N Expost 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20  20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 
T Critical Value @ 5%  2.06 2.06 2.06 2.06 2.06 2.06 2.06 2.06  2.02 2.02 2.02 2.02 2.02 2.02 2.02 2.02 
T Test  3.27 3.07 7.31 5.48 0.74 1.93 2.04 1.90  0.48 1.13 3.04 6.59 0.03 1.51 4.27 3.57 
P Value 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.46 0.09 0.07 0.09  0.64 0.27 0.00 0.00 0.98 0.14 0.00 0.00 
Standard Error 0.02 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.24 0.04 0.02 0.05  0.06 0.02 0.02 0.01 1.02 0.06 0.01 0.07 
Obs 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28  44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 
Mean 14% 9% 22% 11% 33% 10% 33% 51%  7% 4% 7% 21% 29% 12% 56% 129% 
Median 14% 9% 17% 11% 30% 8% 32% 48%  7% 3% 7% 20% -12% 8% 57% 135% 
Std Dev 5% 3% 21% 2% 85% 7% 5% 12%  20% 7% 9% 5% 364% 23% 5% 27% 
Min 3% 2% 1% 7% -73% 1% 27% 36%  -96% -31% -5% 13% -1505% -94% 45% 81% 
Max 26% 14% 83% 15% 349% 32% 46% 85%  52% 21% 25% 33% 1157% 61% 68% 209% 
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Table 7. cont. 
 ROE ROA %Sales MGM NI NI/S DR DER  ROE ROA %Sales MGM NI NI/S DR DER 
 GMEXICO  BACHOCO 
Exante Mean 13% 4% 37% 28% 391% 22% 36% 63%  16% 12% 14% 14% 40% 14% 21% 27% 
Expost Mean 10% 2% 12% 21% 275% 9% 58% 146%  12% 9% 5% 11% 73% 10% 21% 27% 
Variance  EXANTE 0.01 0.00 0.41 0.02 165.94 0.01 0.01 0.14  0.01 0.00 0.04 0.00 1.26 0.00 0.00 0.01 
Variance  EXPOST 0.03 0.00 0.11 0.03 47.33 0.02 0.00 0.12  0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 4.36 0.00 0.00 0.00 
N Exante 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24  24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 
N Expost 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20  20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 
T Critical Value @ 5%  2.02 2.02 2.02 2.02 2.02 2.02 2.02 2.02  2.02 2.02 2.02 2.02 2.02 2.02 2.02 2.02 
T Test  0.78 1.50 1.68 1.42 0.38 2.96 7.87 7.52  1.90 2.02 2.27 1.97 0.63 2.08 0.40 0.09 
P Value 0.44 0.14 0.10 0.16 0.71 0.01 0.00 0.00  0.06 0.05 0.03 0.06 0.53 0.04 0.69 0.93 
Standard Error 0.04 0.01 0.15 0.05 3.05 0.04 0.03 0.11  0.02 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.52 0.02 0.01 0.02 
Obs 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44  44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 
Mean 12% 3% 25% 25% 338% 16% 46% 101%  14% 11% 10% 12% 55% 12% 21% 27% 
Median 10% 1% -1% 19% 30% 17% 50% 102%  15% 12% 7% 13% 14% 14% 22% 28% 
Std Dev 12% 4% 53% 16% 1049% 15% 15% 55%  7% 6% 16% 6% 162% 6% 5% 8% 
Min -8% -3% -27% -2% -544% -9% 24% 32%  -10% -7% -10% -1% -178% -8% 11% 12% 
Max 39% 18% 182% 53% 6112% 47% 65% 189%  27% 20% 59% 22% 634% 21% 32% 46% 
                  
 TELMEX  CMOCTEZ 
Exante Mean 18% 11% 1% 37% 40% 23% 33% 57%  16% 14% 38% 40% 69% 30% 12% 14% 
Expost Mean 32% 12% 6% 34% -2% 19% 61% 158%  19% 16% 11% 45% 6% 31% 17% 20% 
Variance  EXANTE 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 2.60 0.00 0.02 0.22  0.01 0.00 0.05 0.01 0.53 0.01 0.00 0.01 
Variance  EXPOST 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.08  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 
N Exante 24 24 20 24 20 24 24 24  20 20 16 20 16 20 20 20 
N Expost 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20  20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 
T Critical Value @ 5%  2.02 2.02 2.02 2.02 2.02 2.02 2.02 2.02  2.02 2.02 2.03 2.02 2.03 2.02 2.02 2.02 
T Test  4.74 1.41 1.65 3.81 1.15 2.90 10.32 8.72  1.65 1.41 4.68 1.81 3.33 0.51 3.02 2.75 
P Value 0.00 0.17 0.11 0.00 0.26 0.01 0.00 0.00  0.11 0.17 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.61 0.00 0.01 
Standard Error 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.36 0.01 0.03 0.12  0.02 0.02 0.06 0.03 0.19 0.02 0.02 0.02 
Obs 44 44 40 44 40 44 44 44  40 40 36 40 36 40 40 40 
Mean 24% 12% 4% 35% 19% 21% 45% 103%  18% 15% 23% 43% 34% 31% 14% 17% 
Median 22% 11% 1% 36% 1% 21% 51% 105%  19% 17% 16% 45% 20% 33% 13% 14% 
Std Dev 12% 3% 9% 3% 115% 6% 17% 64%  6% 5% 20% 8% 59% 7% 5% 8% 
Min -2% -2% -17% 29% -30% -4% 20% 25%  4% 3% 3% 21% -30% 14% 6% 6% 
Max 54% 17% 28% 40% 720% 33% 68% 217%  29% 23% 88% 52% 251% 41% 25% 33% 
                  
 GSANBORNS  KOF 
Exante Mean 10% 5% 84% 12% 1208% 8% 56% 133%  14% 7% 15% 11% 20% 6% 52% 108% 
Expost Mean 17% 7% -3% 15% 213% 8% 59% 153%  21% 10% 25% 20% 37% 11% 53% 118% 
Variance  EXANTE 0.00 0.00 0.97 0.00 1688.1 0.00 0.01 0.18  0.00 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.23 0.00 0.00 0.02 
Variance  EXPOST 0.01 0.00 0.07 0.00 37.68 0.00 0.01 0.21  0.01 0.00 0.16 0.00 0.47 0.00 0.01 0.16 
N Exante 16 16 12 16 12 16 16 16  24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 
N Expost 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20  20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 
T Critical Value @ 5%  2.03 2.03 2.04 2.03 2.04 2.03 2.03 2.03  2.02 2.02 2.02 2.02 2.02 2.02 2.02 2.02 
T Test  2.54 1.71 3.01 2.25 0.83 0.06 1.32 1.31  2.61 2.40 0.97 7.75 0.97 5.67 0.55 1.03 
P Value 0.02 0.10 0.01 0.04 0.42 0.95 0.20 0.20  0.01 0.02 0.34 0.00 0.34 0.00 0.59 0.31 
Standard Error 0.02 0.01 0.29 0.01 11.94 0.01 0.03 0.15  0.02 0.01 0.10 0.01 0.18 0.01 0.02 0.09 
Obs 36 36 32 36 32 36 36 36  44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 
Mean 14% 6% 30% 14% 586% 8% 58% 144%  17% 8% 19% 15% 28% 8% 52% 113% 
Median 16% 6% 9% 15% 33% 9% 58% 138%  15% 7% 7% 15% 21% 7% 52% 110% 
Std Dev 8% 3% 75% 3% 2542% 4% 8% 45%  8% 5% 33% 6% 58% 4% 6% 29% 
Min -3% -1% -69% 4% -118% -1% 36% 56%  2% 1% -13% 5% -53% 2% 43% 77% 
Max 25% 12% 292% 17% 14252% 18% 71% 243%  39% 21% 143% 25% 191% 19% 67% 203% 
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